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CAPITAL CONFUSION: THE EFFECT OF
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
DECISION TO IMPOSE DEATH
SUSIE CHO
I. INTRODUCTION
In criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees to the accused the right of trial byjury.' His-
torically, the jury has been exalted as the conscience of the commu-
nity and as a buffer between the state and the accused.2 At the same
time, however, there have been fears ofjuror incompetence and parti-
ality. Juries that cannot or will not apply the law pose a danger to the
liberties of a defendant. This concern is particularly relevant in capi-
tal cases where the severity and finality of the "ultimate" punishment
require an accurate application of the law.
This comment discusses the sentencing jury's comprehension
and application of the law in capital cases. Beginning with Section
Two, this comment explores the jury's role as finder of fact, while
warning against the danger of giving juries discretionary power which
could lead to jury nullification. Section Three provides an overview of
the sentencer's role in death penalty cases, focusing specifically on the
Supreme Court's efforts to resolve the tension between avoiding the
arbitrary infliction of the death penalty and handing down a sentence
suited to the individual defendant. Section Four analyzes the effec-
tiveness of pattern jury instructions, including evidence of juror in-
comprehension of such instructions. Finally, in Section Five, this
comment concludes that defendants in death penalty cases must have
the right to appellate review of juror comprehension of instructions.
Without this right, defendants are not fully protected against the arbi-
trary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.
I The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in part: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury..." U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also article III, § 2, ci. 3: "The trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
2 JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 277 (1988) (citations omitted).
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
II. ROLE OF THE JURY
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Although there is debate as to whether the jury system originated
as a uniquely English institution,3 commentators in England valued
the jury,4 and the United States adopted the basic English system at its
inception.5 The Framers of the Constitution viewed the jury trial as
an effective mechanism for maintaining "local control over the critical
decisions of government."6 In the criminal trial, however, jurors
played a greater role than in civil cases. This heightened degree of
discretion reflected the thinking that in criminal law, as opposed to
civil law, laypersons could determine moral culpability as competently
as judges.7 The Supreme Court also recognized the integral role of
the jury in criminal proceedings: "Those who wrote our constitutions
know from history and experience that it was necessary to protect
against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies
and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority."8
B. JURY NULLIFICATION: IS THE JURY THE FINDER OF FACT OR THE
FINDER OF LAW?
People criticize the system of trial by jury as often as they praise
it.9 Many criticisms focus on the competence and representativeness
of jury members. Underlying these criticisms is the belief that jurors
invent laws or nullify existing law by straying from formal jury instruc-
3 CompareJusTIcE TOM C. CLAJURY 1 (Frederick Woleslagel ed., 2d ed. 1975) ("The
jury is, of course, uniquely English.") (citations omitted), with MoRRISJ. BLOOMSTEIN, JURY
5 (Frederick Woleslagel ed., 2d ed. 1975) ("Although most historians defend their own pet
theories as to the origin of the English form ofjury, it is safe to say that no one has actually
proven its parentage.") (citations omitted).
4 As Blackstone wrote:
[I]n settling and adjusting a question of fact, when intrusted to any single magistrate,
partiality and injustice have an ample field to range in.... Here, therefore, a compe-
tent number of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from among those of the
middle rank, will be found the best investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of
public justice.
BLOOMSrEIN, supra note 3, at 9 (citations omitted).
5 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See GUINTHER, supra note 2, at
30-33; LLOYD E. MOORE, TE JURY. TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 95-97 (2d ed.
1988).
6 Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juies and the Death Penalty, 41 CAse W. REs. L. Ray. 1047,
1053 (1991).
7 Id. at 1051.
8 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
9 See, e.g., Warren Burger, Is Our Juy System Working?, READER'S DIGEST, Feb. 1981 (ar-
guing that limitations in access to courts and to juries are necessary to prevent a total
breakdown in the effective and timely dispensation ofjustice).
1994] 533
SUSIE CHO
tions.' 0 Generally, jury nullification occurs whenever a jury uses its
discretionary power to modify or circumvent the requirements of the
law." To its advocates, jury nullification is the power to "perfect" the
law by injecting a "touch of mercy" where it may not be permitted.1 2
Under this definition, jury nullification allows the jury to vote its
conscience.
Jury nullification occurs in practice through the use of the gen-
eral verdict.' 3 When the juries pronounce their verdict of "guilty" or
"not guilty," the court does not seek justification from them. 14 Juries
do not, and in most cases may not, reveal the facts found, their rea-
sons, or the method in which they applied the court's instructions
during deliberation.' 5 Since appellate courts generally cannot set the
verdict aside when ajury acquits, the jury is able to effectively make or
nullify existing law, even though the evidence would seem to clearly
support a finding of guilty.' 6 Although three states permit ajury nulli-
fication instruction,17 the Supreme Court and lower courts are uneasy
about the power of jury nullification.' 8 Similarly, commentators ar-
gue that jury nullification comes close to anarchy.'9
10 Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 781, 781 (1979).
11 Bruce McCall, Comment, Sentencing by Death QualifiedJuries and the Right to Jury Nulli-
fication, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 289 (1985).
12 Alan W. Scheflin &Jon M. Van Dyke, MercifulJuries: The Resilience ofJury Nullification,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 167 (1991).
13 Benton L. Becker, Jury Nullfication: Can A Jury Be Trusted?, TRLAL, Oct. 1980, at 42.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969). But see Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) ("If ajury refused to convict even though the evidence
supported the charge, its verdict would have to be reversed and a verdict of guilty entered
or a new trial ordered, since the discretionary act ofjury nullification would not be permit-
ted.") (dictum).
17 Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland permit a jury nullification instruction. Article XV,
§ 5 of the Maryland Constitution states that in criminal cases the jury shall be the judge of
the law as well as fact. MD. CONST. art. XV, § 5. Some Maryland jurists, however, consider
this section a "blight on the administration ofjustice in Maryland" and a "Constitutional
thorn in the flesh of Maryland's... criminal law." Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The
Right to Say No, 45 S. CAu_ L. REv. 168, 202-03 (1972) (citations omitted). Cf Hebron v.
State, 627 A.2d 1029, 1036 (Md. 1993) (jury's role with respect to the law limited to "resolv-
ing conflicting interpretations of the law of the crime and determining whether that law
should be applied in dubious factual situations").
18 See, e.g., Sparf& Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (public safety would be
endangered if juries in criminal cases were to become a "law unto themselves"); United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1131-34 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing the historical treat-
ment of jury nullification and holding that a defendant does not have the right to an
instruction informing the jury of its right to ignore the law); United States v. Battiste, 24 F.
Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545) (Story, J.) (holding that the court must in-
struct the jury as to the law and that the jury has a duty to follow that law).
19 See Mortimer Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, On Justified Rule Departure By Officials, 59
534 [Vol. 85
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Proponents ofjury nullification cite early precedent in support of
the right to nullify, particularly the 1735 trial ofJohn Peter Zenger.20
Zenger, a printer in the colony of New York, printed stories criticizing
the Royal Governor of New York, William Cosby.21 While political op-
ponents of Cosby controlled the content of the paper and Zenger only
printed it,22 Zenger was prosecuted for the publication of the articles
pursuant to the doctrine of seditious libel.23 Zenger's defense coun-
sel, Andrew Hamilton, decided to concede the issue of publication
and argue the legal questions of whether the publication was libelous
and whether truth should be a viable defense.2 4
Although both legal issues were decidedly against Zenger,25
Hamilton argued that the jury must go beyond its traditional role as
the finder of fact and nullify the law in order to return a true general
verdict:26
[Juries] have the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law and
the facts, and where they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so.
This of leaving it to the judgment of the Court whether the words are
libelous or not in effect renders juries useless (to say no worse) in many
cases.
27
Although the judge instructed the jury that they must follow the law,
the jury returned a not guilty verdict.
At the time of the Zenger trial, and throughout the early years of
the republic, there was a wide-spread uneasiness of government au-
thority. The emerging philosophy of democracy motivated the people
to seek control over almost every aspect of government, including the
administration of law and justice.2 8 The trial of John Peter Zenger
CAL. L. REv. 905 (1971); Burke Marshall, Should Jurors Be Told They Can Refuse to Enforce the
Law?: Jurors Must Respect the Law, 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (Mar. 1986); Philip B. Scott, July Nullifica-
tion: An Historical Perspective on a Modem Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 389 (1989); Gary J.
Simson,Juy Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REv. 488 (1976);
Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv.
825 (1990).
20 Scott, supra note 19, at 408.
21 JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATivE OF THE CASE AND TIAL OFJOHN PETER ZENGER,
PRINTER OF THE NEw YORK WEEKLYJOURNAL (S. Katz ed., 1963).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 18.
24 Id at 23.
25 Id. at 22-23.
26 Scott, supra note 19, at 414.
27 ALEXANDER, supra note 21, at 91.
28 Scott, supra note 19, at 416-17. As one jurist stated: "In many of the colonies... the
arbitrary temper and unauthorized acts of the judges, holding office directly from the
crown, made the independence of the jury, in law as well as fact, a matter of great popular
importance." William v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 396 (1856). Furthermore, adherence to the
political philosophy of democracy meant that the early American people had a basic dis-
trust of legal experts and "a profound belief in the ability of the common man." Scott,
5351994]
SUSIE CHO
thus came to represent an American tradition of the jury's right to
decide the law. Over time, however, the justifications for jury nullifi-
cation became less compelling. Suffrage was slowly granted, and thus,
the people had greater input into government through their elected
representatives. Such representatives included judges, who were no
longer appointees of the crown but were instead either elected by the
people, or appointed by representatives elected by the people.2 9
Judges have since restricted the jury's prerogative to make the
law. Culminating in Sparf & Hansen v. United States,30 the Supreme
Court has rejected the right ofjury nullification and limited the jury's
role to that of finder of fact. As the Court stated in Sparf & Hansen,
"[p] ublic and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be
established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the
law as expounded to them by the court and become a law unto them-
selves."31 Under a jury nullification system, the judge's primary duty
would be to preside and keep order, while jurors who were untrained
in the law would decide cases according to their perceptions of rele-
vant legal principles.32 As a result,
the courts, although established in order to declare the law, would for
every practical purpose be eliminated from our system of government as
instrumentalities devised for the protection equally of society and of in-
dividuals in their essential rights. When that occurs our government will
cease to be a government of laws, and become a government of men.
Liberty regulated by law is the underlying principle of our institutions. 33
After Sparf & Hansen, it is evident that jury nullification arose out of
the Zenger trial solely as an extreme reaction to unrepresentative au-
thority. Since this concern is no longer present, the Zenger trial does
not support a right to jury nullification. 34
supra note 19, at 417. Ultimately, pragmatic considerations may have prevailed. Because a
large percentage of the judiciary were laymen, it seemed only natural for the jury to involve
itself in legal determinations when the judge had had little more training than the jurors
themselves. Id.
29 Scott, supra note 19, at 418. Also, the increasing professionalization of the law
brought about a widening gap in legal expertise between judge and jury. Id.
30 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
31 Id. at 101.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 102-03.
34 Scott, supra note 19, at 419. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, judges started
to assert greater control over criminal juries. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas.
1323, 1325-26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15, 815) (court can take case from jury when
interests of public justice necessitate); Duffy v. People, 26 N.Y. 588, 593 (1863) ("They [the
jury] have the power to... [disregard the court's instructions], but the exercise of such
power cannot be regarded as rightful, although the law has provided no means, in criminal
cases, of reviewing their decisions whether of law or fact, or of ascertaining the grounds
upon which their verdicts are based.").
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Apart from precedent, proponents ofjury nullification claim that
the jury, as a representative cross-section of the community,3 5 can pro-
vide a mechanism for legislative change, by nullifying unpopular and
obsolete laws.3 6 Jury nullification can thus provide a refuge for those
who may have violated the letter, but not the spirit of the law.37 More-
over, jurors who are forced by the judge's instructions to convict a
defendant whose conduct they support, or at least feel is justifiable,
will feel betrayed by a court that forces them to reach such a result.38
This argument reveals an important difference between modem
jury nullification doctrine and traditional doctrine: the proponent's
assertion thatjurors have the right to vote according to their personal
views of morality.3 9 Today, nullification is urged not so that ajury can
refuse to apply an oppressive law,40 but rather so that the jury can
further the defendant's political or social agenda. Antinuclear protest
cases4' and abortion protest cases42 are examples where the defendant
asked for ajury nullification instruction.
This argument fails to consider the fact that jury nullification of
this kind would inhibit rather than encourage implementation of nec-
essary legislative reform.43 Advocating juries to ignore the law or to
return a verdict contrary to both the evidence and the law invites
chaos. Equaljustice is not served when one defendant is rescued from
an unpopular law by jury nullification, because the perception is that
justice is basically being done.44 With this in mind, there is little in-
35 The assumption that juries are an effective and accurate spokesmodel for the com-
munity is weakened by the statistical research and the litigation surrounding the unrepre-
sentative nature of the typical jury. Scott, supra note 19, at 422. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400 (1991) (white defendant objecting to prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to remove seven black venirepersons from the jury).
36 Becker, supra note 13, at 43.
37 Id.
38 Scheflin, supra note 17, at 169.
39 Scheflin and Van Dyke, supra note 12, at 178. Some scholars advocate the right of
jurors to completely disregard existing law; most of those scholars who favor the right of
jury nullification, however, would nevertheless limit the extent to which the jury can do so.
See, e.g., Becker, supra note 13; Frank A. Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representation and the
Power ofJuiy Nullification, 28 CAsE W. RES. L. Ray. 269 (1978); McCall, supra note 11; Steven
D. Osterman, Should Jurors Be Told They Can Refuse to Enforce the Law?: Law Must Respect
Consciences, 72 A.B.A. J. 36 (Mar. 1986); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 12.
40 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), where the Court, in detailing
the history of mandatory death penalty statutes, noted that jurors reacted unfavorably to
the harshness of such statutes and frequently refused to convict murderers rather than
subject them to automatic death sentences. Id. at 289-90.
41 State v. Champa, 494 A.2d 102 (LI. 1985). The court denied the defendant's
request.
42 United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983). The court denied the de-
fendant's request.
43 Simson, supra note 19, at 514.
44 Scheflin and Van Dyke, supra note 12, at 167 n.8.
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centive for legislative action. The law most likely will remain on the
books, adversely affecting those unlucky defendants who did not re-
ceive ajury willing to exercise nullification. 45 Therefore, juries should
not act as quasi-legislators, deciding which laws to eliminate or
revise. 46
Courts have almost universally condemned the doctrine of jury
nullification. One study of 204 jury verdicts found that rule depar-
tures occurred only under fairly specialized circumstances, particu-
larly in cases involving a serious offense, a young victim, or an
employed defendant.47 Considering the lack of judicial support for
the doctrine ofjury nullification, any instances of departure from the
law are disturbing. When jury nullification is motivated by sympathy,
the verdict is acquittal, which may pose an injustice to society. Con-
versely, when nullification is motivated by prejudice or vengeance, the
result is a conviction, which unjustly punishes an innocent person. To
ensure equal justice, juries must confine their decisions within the
given instructions. 48
Furthermore, although a jury may have the power to nullify the
law in certain jurisdictions, it does not have the right.49 Limiting the
jury's role to finder of fact is especially vital to carrying out the objec-
tives of the Supreme Court in its death penalty decisions.50 Permit-
ting an expansion of that role would promote arbitrary
decisionmaking in an area of law where, considering the finality of the
punishment, the defendant deserves "super due process" rights.5'
III. DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE: TENSION BETWEEN AVOIDING
ARBITRARINESS AND PROMOTING INDIVIDUALIZATION
The death penalty is qualitatively different from any other form
45 Simson, supra note 19, at 515.
46 Scheflin and Van Dyke, supra note 12, at 167 n.8.
47 Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAw &
Soc'y 781, 785-95 (1979).
48 "The function ofjury instructions is to... [inform the jury of] the correct principles
of law ... [to apply] to the facts[,] so that the jury can arrive at a correct conclusion
according to the law and the evidence." People v. Jamerson, 503 N.E.2d 1124, 1125 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987).
49 Scott, supra note 19, at 391.
50 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
664-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
51 See, e.g., MargaretJane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Pr-
cessforDeath, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1980). Radin argues that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), requires sentencing procedures amounting to
a kind of super due process. She concludes that under our legal system, execution is cruel
punishment which does not accord respect to any defendant sentenced to death. Id.
538 [Vol. 85
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of punishment.5 2 Although the Supreme Court recognizes that the
severity and finality of the death sentence require heightened proce-
dural safeguards,53 it is not so apparent what these standards must be
for a death sentence to be constitutional.5 4
The role of the jury in death penalty sentencing is similarly un-
clear.55 The commitment to the idea of trial by jury is less strong
when the focus shifts from the guilt/innocence stage of the proceed-
ing to determination of the sentence.5 6 The instinctive belief about
the imposition of the death penalty is that the decision is best reached
by a group of citizens who share the responsibility for imposing such a
drastic penalty.5 7 In Bullington v. Missouri,5 8 Justice Powell recognized
a "fundamental difference" between the sentencing stage and the
guilt/innocence stage of the trial: "Underlying the question of guilt
or innocence is an objective truth: the defendant, in fact, did or did
not commit the acts constituting the crime charged[,] ... [whereas]
[t]he sentencer's function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out
just deserts as he sees them."59 Contrary to Powell's determination,
however, the Supreme Court has wavered under the tension of at-
tempting to avoid capriciousness in the imposition of the death pen-
alty while granting jurors the discretion to give sentences suited to the
particular individual.60
A. MI"CGAUTRA AND UNBRIDLED JURY DISCRETION
Prior to the Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,61 the
jury had untrammeled discretion to impose a death sentence. In Mc-
Gautha v. California,62 the Court rejected the argument that such un-
bridled jury discretion was unconstitutional. 63 Since the Court
believed that it would be nearly impossible to formulate standards to
52 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., with Brennan, J., and
Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3 Id.
54 Michael J. Crowley, Comment, Jury Coercion in Capital Cases: How Much Risk Are We
Willing to Take?, 57 U. CIN. L. Ray. 1073, 1073 (1989).
55 Higginbotham, supra note 6, at 1047-48.
56 Id. at 1047. Higginbotham offers two reasons for his assertion: first, "sentencing is
not in the exclusive province of [the jury]," and second, "the vision of the jury as a buffer
between the state and the accused becomes cloudy in sentencing. When the question is
whether ajury that has convicted should also be allowed to impose the sentence, concerns
over competence, bias, and motive (vengeance) arise." Id. at 1047-48.
57 Id. at 1048.
58 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 450.
60 See Sections IC and lID, infra.
61 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
62 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
63 Id. at 207.
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guide the jury's discretion,6 the Court determined that a jury must
"do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the con-
science of the community on the ultimate question of life or death."65
In support of this conclusion, the Court stressed that granting
juries discretion in sentencing was a response by the legislature to
combat the problem of jury nullification. 66 Jury nullification was a
problem that had to be addressed by "broader discretion" because
death penalty statutes in effect at the time were harsh, requiring a
mandatory sentence of death for certain offenses. 67
B. FURMAN V GEORGIA: AVOIDING THE ARBITRARY IMPOSITION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY
The Supreme Court's pronouncement that it was not feasible to
develop standards to guide jury sentencing in capital cases proved to
be short-lived. In Furman v. Georgia,68 the Court invalidated the death
penalty laws in thirty-nine states as well as the federal death penalty
law.69 Because the jury had unbridled discretion to impose the death
penalty, the Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.70
Most states responded in one of two ways to Justice Stewart's opin-
ion that the death penalty statutes at issue permitted "this unique pen-
alty" to be "wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed."71 Some states
decided to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the
culpability of the defendant; other states imposed a mandatory death
sentence for a limited category of cases (thus completely eliminating
discretion in those cases).
In a series of decisions in 1976, the Court attempted to refine and
clarify its decision in Furman.72 The Court upheld guided sentencing
64 Id. at 204. "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides
and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express the characteristics
in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, ap-
pear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability." Id.
65 Id. at 202 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
66 Id. at 199.
67 Id. at 198-99.
68 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
69 Id. at 239-40.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall called for the
abolition of all existing capital punishment statutes. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
72 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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statutes73 and rejected mandatory death sentence statutes.74 The 1976
cases illustrate the difficulties in formulating a black letter rule in
death penalty cases.
The Court explained in Gregg v. Georgia75 that Furman required
capital sentencing discretion to be "suitably directed and limited so as
to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."76 A
bifurcated procedure-where the question of sentence is not consid-
ered until the determination of guilt has been made-could eliminate
the constitutional deficiencies addressed in Furman.77
However, a bifurcated procedure "is not alone sufficient to guar-
antee that the information will be properly used in the imposition of
punishment, especially if sentencing is performed by ajury."78 Jurors
have had little, if any, previous experience in sentencing. The Court
stated that courts could alleviate this problem if they gave juries gui-
dance in their decisionmaking.79 In a complete turnaround from the
rationale in McGautha that standards could not be developed to guide
a capital sentencingjury,80 the Court maintained that mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, when weighed against each other, would
provide guidelines and reduce the possibility that ajury will impose an
arbitrary or capricious sentence. 81
The Court, in Proffitt v. Florida,82 upheld a sentencing scheme
similar to that in Gregg; which weighed statutory aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. 83 Unlike the sentencing scheme in Gregg, Flor-
ida's sentencing scheme required the jury's role to be strictly advisory.
The actual sentence was determined by the trial judge. Concluding
that jury sentencing* had never been constitutionally required,8 4 the
Court stated that judicial sentencing should, if anything, result in
greater consistency at the trial court level of capital punishment, be-
cause a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than ajury.85 In
addition, the trial judge can more uniformly mete out sentences simi-
lar to those handed down in cases with analogous fact patterns.86
73 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
74 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280.
75 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
76 Id at 189.
77 Id. at 191-92.
78 Id. at 192.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 193.
81 Id at 193-94.
82 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
83 Id. at 253.





Thus, Florida's capital sentencing procedures adequately assured that
the death penalty would not be applied in an arbitrary manner.8 7
In Woodson v. North Carolina,88 apprehension about jury idiosyn-
crasies led to a statutorily-mandated death sentence for a defendant
convicted of first-degree murder.8 9 The defendant argued that his
punishment violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.90
Agreeing with the defendant, the Court stated that the primary con-
sideration in the application of the Eighth Amendment was a "deter-
mination of contemporary standards regarding the infliction of
punishment."91 "[I] ndicia of societal values.., included history and
traditional usage, legislative enactments and jury determinations."9 2
Regarding history, the Court noted that a majority of states had re-
jected mandatory death penalty statutes as unduly harsh and rigid.93
The legislative trend toward discretionary sentencing statutes instead
of automatic death penalty statutes reflected jurors' reluctance to con-
vict persons of capital offenses in mandatory death penalty
jurisdictions.94
Moreover, mandatory death penalty statutes did not provide any
standard to guide the jury in its determination of which defendants
would live and which would die.95 The Court stated that
[i]nstead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a mandatory scheme
may well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman by resting the
penalty determination on the particularjury's willingness to act lawlessly.
While a mandatory death penalty may reasonably be expected to in-
crease the number of persons sentenced to death, it does not fulfill
Furman's basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury dis-
cretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.96
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the mandatory capital punish-
ment scheme violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.97
Gregg, Proffitt, and Woodson demonstrate the Court's concern that
unbridled jury discretion will result in a death sentence being "wan-
tonly and... freakishly imposed."98 Although the jury has been lim-
87 Id. at 252-53.
88 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
89 Id. at 286.
90 Id. at 285.
91 Id. at 288.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 291-93.
94 Id. at 293, 295.
95 Id. at 302-05.
96 Id. at 303.
97 Id. at 305.
98 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (death sentences examined by
the Court were "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
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ited to finder of fact, the special nature of a death penalty sentencing
does allow jurors some discretion to grant mercy. With this discretion
comes the danger that jurors will not be able to impartially and fairly
decide upon a sentence of life or death. The Court's dedication to a
fair and equal imposition of the death penalty takes into account the
fact that unbridled jury discretion in capital sentencing amounts to no
more than a random distribution of death sentences. 99 The jury, us-
ing its discretion, would be "making law," with no means for a court to
prevent the injustice.
C. LOCKET V, OHO." THE MOVE TOWARD INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING
While stressing the need for non-arbitrary death sentences, the
Court has at the same time required that the death sentence be im-
posed on the basis of individual culpability. Because of the qualitative
difference between death and a sentence of imprisonment (however
long),100 there is a need to ensure that death is the appropriate pun-
ishment for a particular defendant. 01
Beginning with Woodson, the Court started to focus on individual-
ized punishment. In Lockett v. Ohio,'0 2 the Court struck down the
Ohio death penalty statute because it precluded consideration of any
and all mitigating factors.103 The statute stated that once the defend-
ant was found guilty of aggravated murder with at least one of the
seven specified aggravating circumstances, the death penalty must be
imposed unless the sentencing judge finds that one of three specified
mitigating circumstances is established. 10 4
The Court held that the limited range of mitigating circum-
stances (which excluded such factors as participation in the offense
and age) was incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.' 05 As a result, the Court determined that an individualized
decision is essential in capital cases. 10 6 The sentencer must consider
and unusual").
99 See, e.g., Wood.son, 428 U.S. at 303 (rejecting mandatory death sentences because
there was not opportunity for "the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the
character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a
sentence of death").
100 Id. at 305.
101 Id.
102 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
103 Id. at 606-09.
104 Id. at 607.
105 Id. at 608.
106 Id. at 605. Some of the Justices felt that the plurality had gone too far in allowing
discretion to the sentencer. Justice White warned that the plurality's focus on individuali-
zation "invites a return to the pre-Furman days when the death penalty was generally re-
served for those very few for whom society has least consideration." Id. at 623 (White, J.,
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as mitigating factors any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any circumstance surrounding the offense that the defendant of-
fers in mitigation.10 7
D. THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK AGAIN
In the aftermath of Lockett, the range of mitigating factors found
acceptable by the Court has included the defendant's emotional dis-
turbance 08 and "good adjustment" to incarceration between arrest
and trial.10 9 However, in the ensuing years, the focus upon solving
arbitrariness in sentencing has returned. 10 The Supreme Court deci-
sions in Graham v. Collins' and Arave v. Creech' 2 support the renewed
emphasis on limiting the sentencer's discretion so as to minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.
In Graham, the Court upheld the former Texas capital sentencing
system as applied to the defendant. The defendant had alleged that
the three "special issues"" 8 his sentencing jury was required to answer
under the former Texas capital sentencing statute prevented the jury
from giving effect to mitigating evidence of his youth, unstable family
background, and positive characteristics." 4
The Court found that mitigating evidence of family background
and positive character traits was not within the statutory "special is-
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgments of the Court).
Justice Rehnquist stated that "[i]f a defendant as a matter of constitutional law is to be
permitted to offer as evidence in the sentencing hearing any fact, however bizarre, which
he wishes.... the new constitutional doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakish-
ness in the imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it." Id. at 631
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107 Id. at 604.
108 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
109 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
110 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (Woodson-Lockett line of cases "cannot be reconciled" with
Furman); Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions" on Life orDeath-If They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame
the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CAsE. W. REs. L. REv. 1067, 1078 (1991).
111 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
112 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
113 The capital-sentencing statute then in effect required the jury to answer three "spe-
cial issues":
1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the de-
ceased or another would result;
2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the de-
ceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 896, quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071(b) (West
1981).
114 Id. at 896.
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sues" that the jury was to consider." 5 Unlike in Lockett, where the
sentencer was precluded from hearing certain types of mitigating evi-
dence, the defense offered testimony concerning the defendant's up-
bringing and positive character traits.116 The Court concluded that
the statute complied with the Eighth Amendment because it allowed
the defendant to place before the jury any mitigating evidence. The
defense was thus able to direct the jury's attention to evidence of the
defendant's age and potential for rehabilitation.' 7 In his concur-
rence, Justice Thomas argued that a more narrow approach to deter-
mining relevant sentencing criteria was necessary." 8 Moreover, he
stated that the Court should leave the question of which factors were
relevant to the sentencing decision to elected state legislators."19
In Arave, the Idaho Supreme Court had affirmed the defendant's
death sentence, including the trial court's finding of a statutory aggra-
vating circumstance that the defendant "[b]y the murder, or circum-
stances surrounding its commission .... exhibited utter disregard for
human life."' 20 The defendant argued that the "utter disregard" ag-
gravating factor did not adequately channel sentencing discretion.12'
The Court held tlhat the statutory aggravating circumstance met
constitutional requirements. 122 The Court considered the statutory
aggravating circumstance to be sufficiently objective to be determina-
ble, 123 and decided that the phrase also sufficiently narrowed the class
of persons eligible for the death penalty.124 The construction
adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court suitably limited and directed
the sentencer's discretion to minimize the risk of arbitrary decision-
making.' 25
Graham and Arave represent the Court's attempt to reconcile two
competing principles: the need for non-arbitrariness in imposition of
the death penalty and the need for individualized sentencing. Some
members of the Court have been increasingly frustrated by the ten-
sion between the Furman and the Lockett lines of jurisprudence. Dis-
senting in Callins v. Collins,'26 Justice Blackmun maintained that
115 Id. at 902.
116 Id. at 895-96.
17 Id. at 900.
118 Id. at 910 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 914 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120 Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1539 (1993).
121 Id. at 1540.
122 Id. at 1541.
123 Id. at 1542.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1541.
126 114 S.Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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despite the best efforts of courts and legislatures to ensure that capital
punishment be imposed fairly and consistently, the imposition of the
death penalty "remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, ca-
price, and mistake."1 27 Justice Blackmun concluded that the death
penalty, as currently administered, is unconstitutional. 28
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, relied on the text and tradition
of the Constitution to explain the validity of the death penalty:
The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person shall be held to answer
for a capital . . .crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury .... nor be deprived of life... without due process of law."
This clearly permits the death penalty to be imposed, and establishes
beyond doubt that the death penalty is not one of the "cruel and unu-
sual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.' 29
Justice Scalia acknowledged the conflict between Furman's require-
ment that the sentencer's discretion to impose the death penalty be
closely confined and Lockett's requirement that the sentencer's discre-
tion not to impose death be given wider reign.130 Rather than hold
that the death penalty was unconstitutional, however, Justice Scalia
concluded that at least one of the judicially determined irreconcilable
commands-the Lockett line of cases-must be wrong.' 3 '
The Court's compromise has been to require guided discretion.
Veering too far toward a uniform standard threatens to bring back
mandatory death sentence laws. On the other hand, a bold move to-
ward truly individual sentences gives too much discretionary power to
the sentencer, as a jury with unbridled discretion would be able to
sentence defendants at whim. Although juries could exercise their
127 Id. at 1129.
128 Id. at 1138.
129 Id. at 1127. Justice Scalia argues that a "quiet death by lethal injection" is preferable
to the death suffered by the victim in this case: "the murder of a man ripped by a bullet
suddenly and unexpectedly, with no opportunity to prepare himself and his affairs, and left
to bleed to death on the floor of a tavern." Id. at 1128. Justice Scalia does not, however, set
forth any criteria by which to judge which persons deserve more brutal deaths than others.
Consider this Amnesty International account:
The U.S. news magazine Newsweek reported on 9 April 1984 that at his execution in
March, James Autry "took at least ten minutes to die and throughout much of that
time was conscious, moving about and complaining of pain."
AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY 15 (1987).
130 Calins, 114 S. Ct. at 1127.
131 Id. at 1128. Justice Scalia's earlier concurrence in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639
(1990), explicitly identified his preferred choice. There he stated his support for the prin-
ciple announced in Furman that a sentencer's discretion must be constrained by specific
standards, so that the death penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Id. Since the Woodson-Lockett line of cases could not be reconciled with Furman, Justice
Scalia declared that in future cases he would not accept an argument that the sentencer's
discretion had been constrained in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Walton v. Ari-
zona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990).
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power of mercy and refuse to convict, the pendulum could easily
swing in the other direction. Juries would also have the unreviewable
power to sentence a defendant to death for any reason, whether it be
justice or vengeance.13 2 In addition to going against the principles of
Furman, granting that much power to the jury would amount to jury
nullification. 133
The Court, however, may not have gone far enough in attempt-
ing to limit capriciousness. One potential mechanism to guarantee
rationality in the process of sentencing is for the courts to provide
juries with better and more comprehensible penalty phase instruc-
tions.'34 Through tone, emphasis, and substance, comprehensive in-
structions can help deliberations run more smoothly and more
fairly.'3 5
IV. JURY INSTRUCIONS
A. ROLE AND FUNCTION
The primary function ofjury instructions is to convey to the jury
the correct principles of law applicable to the evidence so that the jury
can arrive at a proper conclusion based on the law and the evi-
dence.'36 Fundamental fairness requires that the jury be supplied
with basic instructions.' 37 Without such instructions, the jury would
deliberate in an atmosphere of conjecture and speculation.
Pattern jury instructions are statements of the law designed by
committees ofjudges and lawyers for presentation to jurors. Depend-
132 As Justice Brennan noted,
We are not presented with the slightest attempt to bring the power of reason to bear
on the consideration relevant to capital sentencing. We are faced with nothing more
than stark legislative abdication. Not once in the history of this Court, until today,
have we sustained against a due process challenge such an unguided, unbridled, unre-
viewable exercise of naked power.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 252 (1972) (Brennan,J., dissenting). But see Raoul Ber-
ger, The Jury's Role in Capital Cases is Immune From Judicial Interference, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Ray.
639, 645 ("UJudicial interference with the jury's discretion violates the jury's constitutional
prerogative. For, as a common law attribute of trial by jury, such discretion, like the right
to challenge jurors, is embodied in the Constitution and, therefore, should be immune
from judicial encroachment.").
133 The possibility ofjury nullification-particularly in the direction of vengeance rather
than mercy-is distressing when one considers a recent study. Bohm, Maisto, and Vogel's
research yielded little support for Justice Marshall's belief (expressed in Furman) that an
informed public generally would oppose the death penalty. Robert M. Bohm et al., Knowl-
edge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Panel Study, 21 J. C~iM. Just. 29, 41 (1993).
134 Berger, supra note 110, at 1086.
'35 Id. at 1087.
136 People v. Moya, 529 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
137 People v. McClendon, 554 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); see also People v.
Roberts, 537 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (failure to provide jury instructions
results in the denial of due process).
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ing on the requirements of the specific case, the trial judge chooses
particular pattern instructions for use. s38 In most jurisdictions, in-
structions come from books of approved pattern jury instructions.13 9
Pattern instructions emerged from a desire to simplify the process of
choosing appropriate jury instructions and to reduce appellate court
caseloads caused by alleged error in jury instructions. 140 The pattern
jury instructions were thus designed to be concise, impartial, and ac-
curate statements of law written in language the average juror could
understand.141
One advantage of pattern jury instructions is the impartiality of
the charge. Instructions proposed by attorneys tend to be biased to-
ward their respective parties. 142 Also, judges, even if they try to be
impartial, may unintentionally guide the jury to the "correct" ver-
dict. 143 Pattern jury instructions, on the other hand, are typically
drafted by judges and attorneys representing both sides of the bar. 44
The instructions are also devised separately from specific fact situa-
tions. This provides a higher likelihood of impartiality than jury in-
structions drafted by the parties in a particular case. 145
Another advantage of pattern instructions is their uniformity and
accuracy. Since trial judges regard approved pattern instructions as
accurate, objective statements of law (which take less time to prepare
138 Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Juy Instructions That Jurors Can Under-
stand, 75 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 200 (1984).
139 An example of a pattern jury instruction regarding the sentencing stage of a death
penalty case is as follows:
§ 7C.05 Outcome of Hearing
Under the law, the defendant shall be sentenced to death if you unanimously find
that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death
sentence.
If you are unable to find unanimously that there are no mitigating factors suffi-
cient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, the court will impose a sentence
[ (other than death) (of natural life imprisonment, and no person serving a sentence
of natural life imprisonment can be paroled or released, except through an order by
the Governor for executive clemency)].
1 ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLI-
NOIS PATrERN JURY INSTMUCTIONS, CRIMINAL IPI § 7C.05 (3d ed. 1992).
140 Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurors to Compre-
hend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAw AND SOC'Y REV. 153, 155 (1982). On
whether pattern instructions reduce the number of appeals, Severance, Greene, and Loftus
report that although there is some indication that pattern instructions reduce the number
of reversals "based on claims that the law was incorrectly stated," research has not shown
that the use of pattern instructions has reduced the total number of appeals. Severance et
al., supra note 138, at 200.
141 ROBERT G. NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN
MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 2 (1979).
142 Id. at 13.





than traditional case-by-case instructions),146 they may feel safer using
the pattern instructions than their own instructions. 147 Further since
the instructions are the result of extensive research and discussion,
and are designed to be the model of a technically correct charge,
there is less chance that the instructions will result in an inappropriate
sentence.1 48 Their regular use tends to bring about "equality of treat-
ment of like cases and provides a greater degree of fairness to those
involved in the judicial process."149
This is not to say, however, that pattern instructions are without
disadvantages. One criticism is that they are too abstract. Drafters of
standard instructions do not rely upon a specific set of facts, and
courts use those instructions in all cases involving the issue which they
cover.150 Thus, "because they are written to apply in general, they do
not apply effectively to any case in particular."' 51 Yet the problem may
not be the abstractness of the instructions, but the failure to use them
properly. For example, in some jurisdictions, judges cannot provide
any context to the jury; they are either forbidden to refer to the evi-
dence, or are discouraged from doing so for fear of being reversed. 152
Another limitation pointed out by commentators is that pattern
instructions discourage flexibility. Particularly when prepared by a
committee of the state supreme court, pattern instructions are often
regarded as "error-proof.'u53 Therefore, trial courtjudges are seldom
willing to allow even minor modifications.154 The tendency to
"freeze" the legal language of pattern instructions results from trial
court wariness and the general resistance to changing the language
that has already been approved in appellate court opinions. 155
B. COMPREHENSION OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The most serious charge against typical pattern jury instructions
is thatjurors do not understand instructions. Instructions are drafted
to be legally precise, and as far back as 1930, commentators have criti-
cized jury comprehension of instructions. As the juristJerome Frank
stated:
[t]ime and money and lives are consumed in debating the precise words
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 18.
149 Id. at 14.
150 Id. at 39.
151 Severance & Loftus, supra note 140, at 156.
152 NIEA.-AND, supra note 141, at 39-40.
153 Id. at 41.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 42.
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which the judge may address to the jury, although everyone who stops to
see and think knows that these words might as well by spoken in a for-
eign language that indeed, for all the jury's understanding of them, they
are spoken in a foreign language. 156
One researcher studying the effect of judges' instructions found
that eighty percent of his subjects did not understand basic rules of
evidence and burdens of proof,157 also demonstrating that "although
pattern instructions may be effective in reminding jurors of concepts
with which they already are generally familiar, they do not improve
comprehension of new, difficult or counter-intuitive laws."
5 8
Some commentators assert that the emergence of instructions
with convoluted sentence structure and complicated and confusing
legal jargon is a side effect of appellate review.' 5 9 The sources ofjuror
misunderstanding lay in the syntax of the instructions, the manner of
presentation, and the general unfamiliarity of laypersons with legal
terminology. 16 0 Accordingly, a few courts have recognized the impor-
tance of clear language injury instructions. In People v. Wilson,' 6 1 for
example, the court reversed a jury verdict where the judge had given
pattern instructions instead of using "concrete and direct language
defining the rather simple issues of fact which the case presented." 162
Despite general agreement that most jurors do not fully under-
stand the instructions given to them, some courts and commentators
maintain that procedures can be easily implemented to protect the
defendant. For instance, commentators have found that providing a
proper context'6 3 and repeating the instructions throughout the pro-
ceedings 6 4 aid juror comprehension. Moreover, some commentators
have stated that procedural safeguards in the system can negate the
effects of juror incomprehension. Attorneys can teach the jury the
156 JEROME FRANY, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1930).
157 Robert F. Forston, Justice, Jurors and Judges'Instructions, 12JUDGEsJ. 68 (1973).
158 J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology ofJuy Instructions, 69 NEB. L. Rav. 71,
80 (1990).
159 Severance & Loftus, supra note 140, at 154.
160 Id. at 153-54.
161 258 Cal. App. 2d 578 (1968).
162 Id. at 585. The court also stated that pattern instructions "can be of great value to
the judge in preparing his charge to the jury, but it is a misuse of these resources to read to
the jury a lengthy and confusing incantation..." Id.
163 Instructions would be better understood ifjudges would provide context, refer to the
evidence, use examples from the real world, and use the names of persons, places, and
things instead of generic terms such as "plaintiff." See generally Severance et al., supra note
138, at 202, 207-08.
164 Repeating instructions two or three times throughout the proceedings helps juror
comprehension and improves the accuracy of verdicts. See Robert F. Forston, Sense and
Non-Sense: Juy Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601, 621-22 (instructions should be
given not only at the beginning, but also throughout the trial as appropriate).
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meaning of the instructions during voir dire and in the opening and
closing arguments. 165 During voir dire, lawyers may challenge any ju-
ror who does not understand the instructions or is unwilling to abide
by the law. In addition, during opening statements and closing argu-
ments, attorneys should be able to fully explain the law and the legal
issues to the jury.16 6 Unfortunately, juror education by attorneys is
not a completely accepted solution. In fact, in some jurisdictions,
courts do not provide any of these safeguards. 167
Considering the stakes for the defendant in a capital case, giving
instructions without such procedural safeguards, when research sug-
gests that the jurors do not otherwise understand them, is danger-
ous.168 All efforts must be taken to avoid the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of capital punishment. 6 9 Legislatures, courts, and attorneys
need to make efforts to rewrite and improve pattern instructions to
preserve the legitimacy of jury verdicts.
On a broader scale, instructions should also be improved in order
to maintain the symbolic importance of the right to trial by jury.1'70
The jury trial is a central part of the American justice system. To the
typical American citizen, participation in government consists of vot-
ing or jury service or both. For many Americans, jury service may be
their sole contact with the justice system.1'71 Incomprehensible jury
instructions send a message to jurors that they are not expected to
understand the law. The consequences can be severe: jurors may
withdraw from the law, or they may turn to jury nullification and
reach a verdict on their own. They may also lose faith in the criminal
justice system as a whole. 172
C. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Researchers who have conducted experiments to test juror com-
prehension have found that psycholinguistic principles can be applied
165 Severance & Loftus, supra note 140, at 183; Tanford, supra note 158, at 104-06.
166 Forston, supra note 164, at 622.
167 People v. DeLordo, 182 N.E. 726, 731 (Ill. 1932); Brownlee v. State, 116 So. 618, 628
(Fla. 1928).
168 As Justice Brennan stated:
Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human being by
the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity. The
contrast with the plight of a person punished by imprisonment is evident. ... A pris-
oner remains a member of the human family.... His punishment is not irrevocable.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
169 See id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
170 Walter W. Steele,Jr., & Elizabeth G. ThornburgJury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REv. 77, 95 (1988).




to jury instructions to eliminate confusing language, simplify mean-
ing, and present instructions clearly and logically. In one early study,
the juror-subjects paraphrased fourteen pattern jury instructions. The
researchers then rewrote the instructions to eliminate the words and
constructions that seemed to cause confusion and tested the rewritten
instructions on newjuror-subjects.' 73 As a result, the overall compre-
hension of instructions improved 35%.174 The researchers noted that
improvement had occurred even for instructions that were concep-
tually quite difficult. 175
The psycholinguistic principles derived from this study provided
the impetus for further research. In another study that compared
subject comprehension of pattern instructions with revised instruc-
tions, the overall comprehension error rate was 29.3% without any
instructions, 24.3% when researchers used instructions, and 20.3%
when the researchers used revised instructions. 176 Despite improve-
ment, it is noteworthy that considerable errors in comprehension and
application remained even with use of the revised instructions. 177
However slight the increase in understanding, rewritten instruc-
tions do make a difference. Unlike instituting new rules of trial proce-
dure to permit judges to clarify ambiguous instructions 178 or to allow
reading of instructions to the jury both before opening statements
and after closing arguments, rewritten instructions are a more realistic
means of improving comprehension. All that is needed is a commit-
ment by states to rewrite their pattern instructions. 179 An important
173 Steele & Thornburg, supra note 170, at 87.
174 Id.; Charrow and Charrow's major psycholinguistic principles to enhance juror com-
prehension include:
1) Substituting active voice for passive voice;
2) Inserting "whiz" phrases ("which is" or "that is") where needed;
3) Eliminating multiple negatives;
4) Reorganizing sentences to properly locate misplaced phrases and eliminate compli-
cated embedding;
5) Reducing item lists and strings to no more than two, where possible;
6) Using directives such as "must", "should", and permissives such as "may" to help
focus the jurors' attention;
7) Replacing uncommon words with ones that are more common in the language;
and
8) Rearranging existing instructions into a more logical organization.
See Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psychol-
inguistic Study ofJuiy Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1323-27 (1979).
175 Steele & Thornburg, supra note 170, at 87.
176 Severance & Loftus, supra note 140, at 188-90.
177 Id. at 194.
178 See, e.g., Teaney v. City of St.Joseph, 548 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (ury
sent judge note that showed it did not understand an instruction; the appellate court held
it was error for the judge to elaborate on a pattern instruction).
179 See, e.g., Steele & Thornburg, supra note 170, at 90-94 (instructions rewritten by two
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limitation on the search for simpler jury instructions, however, comes
from having to balance the need for specialized legal language against
the goal of juror comprehension. Simplified pattern jury instructions
trade off the value of specialized language in favor of juror
comprehension. 180
In addition, institutional forces contribute to the continued use
of incomprehensible instructions. One is resistance to change. Many
members of the legal community are unaware of the seriousness of
the problem and are untrained in statistical analysis. Many lawyers
and judges are skeptical of empirical research.' 8 ' Because they them-
selves understand the instructions, they assume thatjurors understand
them as well. 182
Other attorneys believe that juror incomprehension benefits
their clients and therefore, they support the status quo. The belief
among these attorneys is that if the jury fails to understand certain
"technical" defenses, the party with the burden of proof or the one
more aligned with the jury's instinctive feelings of "justice" will win.183
Still others resist change because of the cost and time necessary to
rewrite the instructions, which must either be billed to the client or
absorbed by the lawyer.184 Furthermore, judges have few incentives to
change pattern instructions. Trial courts risk reversal when they devi-
ate from the pattern instruction or the language of appellate
opinions.'8 5
However, considering that the empirical research on juror com-
prehension has only shown a slight improvement in juror understand-
ing as a result of rewriting instructions, still more is needed to
safeguard defendants' rights in capital cases. For example, although
research on capital sentencing instructions demonstrated that the new
North Carolina capital penalty phase pattern instructions were better
attorneys using psycholinguistic methods resulted in improved understanding of pattern
instructions).
180 Harvey S. Perlman, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Application of Social Science Research, 65
NEB. L. REv. 520, 535-36 (1986). Perlman also noted:
To the extent that the legal process requires intraprofessional communication as well
as communication with the juror, the attempts to simplify language may have their
costs in efficiency of communication between the lawyers and the judge and the appel-
late courts. And, even looking exclusively at the jury, there must be some point where
the length of an instruction begins to diminish the gains from simplification.
Id. at 537.
181 See generally J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137 (1990) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
aversion to empirical research).
182 See Steele & Thornburg, supra note 170, at 99.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 105.
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understood than the old instructions, comprehension was far from an
acceptable level-only fifty-three percent of the subjects exposed to
the new instructions answered all questions on the research survey
correctly. 186
V. APPELLATE REVIEW OF JUROR COMPREHENSION
Appellate review of jury instructions has tended to focus on the
extent to which instructions reflect the law. Courts scrutinize jury in-
structions for legal accuracy while ignoring juror comprehensibility.
In cases where appellate courts have recognized jury misunderstand-
ing, the courts will nonetheless accept the mistake, not deeming the
error to be great enough to warrant reversal.' 8 7 For example, in Sellers
v. United States,'88 the jurors misunderstood a self-defense instruction
and found the defendant guilty of homicide. Although the jurors
later stated that they would have acquitted the defendant if they had
understood the instruction, the court refused to change the verdict.'8 9
Viewing the incomprehension issue as an assertion of the jury's
right to impeach its verdict, the court in Sellers concluded that the jury
cannot do so on the basis of behavior inherent in a verdict.190 The
partial concurrence/partial dissent in Sellers argued that due process
questions are raised where a misunderstanding of the law leads jurors
to convict when they had intended to acquit: "[A] court is compelled
to balance the possible public injury of undermining verdict finality
against the possible private injury to a litigant amounting to depriva-
tion of a constitutional right."191
186 James Luginbuhl, Comprehension ofJudges' Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital
Tral, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 203, 214 (1992).
187 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Deck Masters, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 438, 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(jury miscalculated damages because of a misunderstanding of the instructions; however,
the court held that a unanimous misconstruction of the language of the charge did not
justify a new trial); Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. 1963) (mistaken juror
repeatedly told other jurors wrong interpretations of the instructions, but the court held
that the juror's statements "amounted to nothing more than a misinterpretation of the
court's charge; and were, consequently, not misconduct").
188 401 A.2d 974, 977 (D.C. 1979).
189 Id. at 982.
190 Id. at 981-82. Jurors also cannot attack the verdict on the ground that they had
agreed to abide by majority vote, that they failed to follow instructions, that they had been
confused, or that ajuror who had agreed to a guilty verdict did not fundamentally believe
in the defendant's guilt. Id. at 982.
191 Id. at 982-83. However, the partial concurrence/partial dissent maintained that ju-
ror testimony regarding confusion on instructions per se would not be admissible. See id. at
983. A distinction between juror misunderstanding and juror confusion seems disingenu-
ous. One can argue that the jurors' confusion was the result of their misunderstanding of
the given instructions. Furthermore, ifjurors were confused by their instructions, perhaps




In contrast to the majority in Sellers, the Seventh Circuit has ad-
dressed the problem of juror incomprehension of instructions as a
due process issue. In Gacy v. Welborn, 92 the court gave little credence
to a juror comprehension study suggesting that jurors did not ade-
quately understand the Illinois death penalty pattern instructions.
Although the court offered a more understandable instruction as an
alternative to the instruction actually given 93 and noted that
"[p]6lysyllabic mystification reduces the quality of justice,"' 94 the
court nonetheless resigned itself to the imperfections of the trial sys-
tem. "[E]ven [a] 'simplified' charge would leave manyjurors dumb-
founded .... As there are no perfect trials, so there are no perfect
instructions."195
In Free v. Peters,196 the defendant, in his petition for habeas
corpus, argued that the specific instructions given to the jury at sen-
tencing did not provide jurors with sufficient constitutional gui-
dance. 197 Based upon ajury comprehension study testing the Illinois
pattern jury instructions (found to be similar to the instructions in the
Free trial) and psycholinguist experts, the district court had deter-
mined that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury was con-
fused about the availability of nonstatutory mitigating factors, the
nature of the burden of persuasion, and which side, if any, had the
burden. 198 The district court had found empirical evidence persua-
sive in its finding that a reasonable juror would not have understood
the instructions. 199
The Seventh Circuit disagreed and reversed the grant of habeas
corpus issued by the district court.200 The court, considering the in-
structions as a whole and in the context of the entire sentencing hear-
ing, determined that there was not a reasonable likelihood that the
jury could have misunderstood the Illinois death penalty statute.201
192 994 F.2d 305, 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 269 (1993).
193 See id. at 307. Perhaps strong feelings among court and jury members about the
petitioner (a serial murderer who killed at least 33 young men) subtly influenced the deci-
sion. The court made much of the fact that the jurors were most likely not confused about
the given instructions because the deliberations were finished and verdicts were brought
out in less than two hours. See id. at 308. The short amount of time spent in deliberations
just as easily could have been the result ofjurors' desire to impose the death sentence and
their unwillingness to fully consider mitigating evidence as required by statute. See 720
ILCS 5/9-1(c) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1994).
194 Gacy, 994 F.2d at 314.
195 Id.
196 12 F3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433 (1994).
197 See id. at 704.
198 See United States ex reL Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
199 See id. at 704.
200 See id. at 706-07.
201 Id. at 704.
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Judge Posner's majority opinion attacked the reliability of the empiri-
cal statistics offered as evidence of juror incomprehension:
[In Zeisel's study], [a] group of people who thought they were going to
serve on ajury were instead given a written examination on what to them
was an imaginary case.... There is little a priori reason to think that the
results of such an examination offer insight into the ability of a real jury,
which has spent days or weeks becoming familiar with the case and has
had the benefit of oral presentations by witnesses, lawyers, and the
judge, and which renders a verdict after discussion rather than in the
isolation of an examination setting.202
In addition to brushing aside juror admissions and empirical evi-
dence ofjuror misunderstanding, courts have thwarted efforts to clar-
ify ambiguous jury instructions. For example, the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide that
The court may not summarize the evidence, express or otherwise indi-
cate to the jury any personal opinion on the weight or credibility of any
evidence, or give any instruction regarding the desirability of reaching a
verdict.2 0 3
The practice of forbidding judges to comment on the evidence ren-
ders the court's instructions awkward, as jurors are given little context
within which to apply their charge.
The Supreme Court's review ofjury instructions has been equally
closed-minded. According to the Court, the jury trial system depends
on the "crucial assumption ... that juries will follow the instructions
given by the trial judge."20 4 This pronouncement has been repeated
in other cases before the Court,20 5 even where empirical evidence of
juror behavior belies the assumption of juror understanding. Aside
from the footnote 11 exception in Brown v. Board of Education,20 6
where the Court cited social-scientific sources as supporting the prop-
osition that segregation has a detrimental effect on children, the
Court is disparaging of social science evidence.207
For example, empirical research suggests that jurors have trouble
202 Id. at 705-06.
203 UNIF. R. CuM. P. 523(E) (1987).
204 Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979). See also Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S.
390, 394 (1932) ("That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of mistake
on the part of the jury is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry
into such matters.").
205 See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) ("We ... presume that a jury will
follow ... instruction[s] . . . ."); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (It is an
"invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions .... ."); City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986) ("IJ]uries act in accordance with the instruc-
tions given them.. . ."); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450 n.13 (Court will not
assume that the jury misunderstood or disobeyed their instructions).
206 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
207 Tanford, supra note 181, at 169-71.
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comprehending instructions and suggests two procedural reforms:
(1) giving important instructions at the beginning as well as at the end
of the trial; and (2) providing jurors with written copies of their in-
structions.208 Out of the three different legal actors-appellate
courts, legislatures, and rule-making commissions-appellate courts
have been the least receptive to social science, moving the law in the
direction opposite to the suggestions of social scientists.209 Legisla-
tures have generally done nothing or moved slightly toward suggested
reforms,210 while commissions have made the most substantial
changes, incorporating the research of social scientists.21'
In reviewing the adequacy ofjury instructions in capital cases, the
Supreme Court proceeds intuitively rather than empirically. In Andres
v. United States,212 the Court considered whether "reasonable men
might derive a meaning from the instructions given other than the
proper meaning [of the statute]."213 Deciding that the instructions
given in a capital case did not fully protect the defendant, the Court
stated that in death penalty cases, doubts about instructions should be
resolved in favor of the accused.214
Later, in Boyde v. California,2 15 the Court was presented with a
death penalty pattern instruction that was ambiguous and therefore
subject to an erroneous interpretation.2 16 The proper inquiry in this
instance, stated the Court, was "whether there [was] a reasonable like-
lihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way
that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evi-
dence."217 A "reasonable likelihood" standard would guarantee a
more accurate verdict than a standard that focuses on the speculations
of a single hypotheticaljuror.218 The Court held that the instructions
were adequate, adding that even if the instructions were less clear
than the Court believed them to be, the context of the entire proceed-
2 0 8 J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures and Commissions Following Em-
pirical Research onJurj Instructions, 25 LAw & Soc'y REv. 155, 156 (1991).
209 Id. at 156-57.
210 Id. at 160.
211 Id. at 161. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 180 at 523-24 (psycholiguistic techniques
suggested by social scientists used by two lawyers in drafting a set of simplified civil pattern
jury instructions for Alaska courts).
212 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
213 Id. at 752.
214 Id.
215 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
216 One of the disputed instructions (since amended) listed as a factor that the jury shall
consider in determining a sentence of death "any other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime." Id. at 373-74 (citing
1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCMIONS, CIuMINAL § 8.84.1 (4th ed. 1979)).




ings would have led reasonable jurors to fully consider evidence of the
petitioner's character and background in mitigation.219 The court af-
firmed the "reasonable likelihood" standard in Johnson v. Texas:220
In evaluating the instructions, we do not engage in a technical parsing of
this language of the instructions, but instead approach the instructions
in the same way that the jury would-with a "commonsense understand-
ing of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the
trial." 22 1
Similarly, in Simmons v. South Carolina,222 the Court recognized
that in some circumstances "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital
to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored."223 In Simmons, the defense counsel asked
for an instruction informing the jury that due to the defendant's prior
record, if the jury did not impose the death penalty, he would be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without parole.224 The defense also sub-
mitted into evidence the results of a statewide public opinion survey
which showed that ninety-three percent of all jury-eligible adults who
were questioned believed that a defendant who was sentenced to life
in prison would in fact be released at some point.225
The defendant argued that, in view of the public's apparent mis-
understanding about the meaning of "life imprisonment" in South
Carolina, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jurors would vote
for the death penalty simply because they believed that the defendant
would eventually be released on parole. 226 The trial judge refused to
allow the defense's instruction.
After deliberating on the defendant's sentence for ninety min-
utes, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking, "Does the imposi-
tion of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?"227 Over
the defendant's objection, the trial judge gave the following instruc-
tion to the jury: "You are instructed not to consider parole or parole
eligibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or parole
eligibility. That is not a proper issue for your consideration. The
terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in
219 The Court noted that four days of defense testimony consuming over 400 pages of
the trial transcript related to the petitioner's background and character could not have
been ignored by reasonable jurors as mitigating evidence. Id. at 383.
220 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
221 Id. at 2669.
222 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
223 Id. at 2197 (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968)).
224 Id. at 2192.
225 Id. at 2191.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 2192.
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their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning."228 Twenty-five minutes after
receiving the trial judge's instruction, the jury sentenced the defend-
ant to death.2 29
The Court reversed and remanded, holding that where future
dangerousness was at issue, and the only alternative to death is life
imprisonment without parole, due process requires that the sentenc-
ing jury know of that alternative.23 0 Justice Blackmun, writing for a
plurality, acknowledged that "the jury reasonably may have believed
that petitioner could be released on parole if he were not executed.
To the extent this misunderstanding pervaded the jury's delibera-
tions, it had the effect of creating a false choice between sentencing
petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited period of incar-
ceration."23' Justice Blackmun added that the trial judge's instruction
directing the jury that life imprisonment should be understood in its
"plain and ordinary" meaning did nothing to dispel the confusion rea-
sonable jurors may have about the way in which a state defines "life
imprisonment."232 In a separate concurrence, Justice Souter, joined
by Justice Stevens, emphasized that the Eighth Amendment demands
heightened reliability in death penalty sentencing and mandates the
recognition of a defendant's right to clarify the meaning of any legal
terms or instructions that may confuse jurors.23 3
The gravamen of Simmons is that the court must inform the jury
of true sentencing alternatives, or else there can be no due process or
rationality in the sentencing process.2 34 A misleading and confusing
jury instruction, such as the one in Simmons, transforms the sentenc-
ing decision into a crapshoot. It must not be forgotten that the issue
being considered is of fundamental importance-whether a person
lives or dies. In arriving at such a decision, ajuror must be appraised
of all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the offense.
The existence of bias in capital juries has been previously docu-
mented.2 35 A biased jury is a formidable barrier to a rational, compre-
hensive application of instructions because the jury willfully
misunderstands its duty. Although educating jurors and removing
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 2190, 2193.
231 Id. at 2193.
232 Id. at 2197.
233 Id. at 2198-99.
234 MarshallJ. Hartman, Deputy Director, Illinois Capital Resource Center, Lecture at
An Update on Illinois Death Penalty Law (July 8, 1994).
235 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: JurorInstructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 12 (1993); Craig Haney, On the Selection of CapitalJuries:
The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984).
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prejudiced jurors during voir dire can alleviate the effects, ajury that
does not understand how to apply law to fact, or because of bias is
unwilling to do so, is given free rein with regard to imposition of the
death penalty. Because the Court assumes that the jury has acted cor-
rectly,2 36 it will examine only the legal accuracy of the instruction and
ignore any evidence of juror misunderstanding or bias.
Continuing to accept the charade of robot-like jurors who
mechanically apply instructions correctly in capital sentencing threat-
ens to bring back the "unbridled jury discretion" of McGautha. This
directly contradicts the Court's emphasis on non-arbitrary capital sen-
tencing and guided discretion. As the Court stated in Saffle v.
ParkS.23 7 "It would be very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the
fate of a defendant to turn on the vagaries of particular jurors' emo-
tional sensitivities with our longstanding recognition that, above all,
capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and nonarbitrary."238
The Court has also recognized that societal values must play a
role in death penalty jurisprudence.23 9 Indicators of societal values
"include history and traditional usage, legislative enactments, and jury
determinations."240 If the Court considers jury actions in deciding the
validity of death penalty statutes, it should consider jury comprehen-
sion when determining the validity of jury instructions, which are also
statements of the law. Ajury that has sentenced a defendant to death
because it misunderstood an otherwise legally accurate instruction is
not following the law. The jury is, in effect, exercising jury nullifica-
tion. The capital jury would, inadvertently, be making its own law as
applied to the particular defendant. Because equal justice is not
served when confused juries sentence one defendant to death and an
identical defendant to imprisonment, jury nullification inhibits uni-
formity and reliability in capital sentencing. The natural conclusion is
the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.
236 This assumption is partly based on the Court's desire to promote an efficient crimi-
nal justice system. See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (rejecting research
demonstrating thatjurors might be unable to follow instructions on disregarding improper
evidence, because ordering new trials after every instance of improper use of evidence
would overwhelm the system). The Court's efficiency argument has less validity in death
penalty cases. Justice must prevail over efficiency here. It is worth the cost in judicial
administration to insure that the defendant has not been sentenced to death by ajury that
misunderstood instructions and felt it had to impose the death penalty.
237 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
238 Id. at 493.
239 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).




The Boyde standard of review-whether, considering the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the sentencing decision, a reason-
able juror would have comprehended the instructions given by the
court-would seem to allow the jury guided discretion in capital sen-
tencing and provide an incentive to courts and attorneys to educate
jurors. However, the Court continues to rely on intuitive assumptions
of juror infallibility. The enormity of the capital sentencing decision
mandates a more critical scrutiny of jury instructions, including juror
comprehension. Death is "an unusually severe punishment, unusual
in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity."241 Empirical research,
contradicting the Court's assumptions, indicates that jurors do not
fully comprehend their instructions. Thus, courts and legislatures
would be better off "attempting to cope with reality rather than set-
tling for a mere judicial ritual., 242
241 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
242 Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 708 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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